This paper extends the framework of Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983a) to nest the case of a cartel (OPEC) faced by a competitive fringe (non-OPEC oil producers). Estimation of a simultaneous equation switching regression model allows us to examine which market structure better characterizes the world oil market during the 1974-2004 period and to test whether switches between collusive and noncooperative behavior occurred. The null hypothesis that no switch occurred is rejected in favor of the alternative that both cooperative and non-cooperative behavior was observed. We …nd that, although there were periods in which oil prices were measurably higher due to collusion among OPEC members, overall OPEC has not been e¤ective in systematically raising prices above Cournot competition levels. Our results suggest that, on average over the period of study, OPEC's behavior is best described as Cournot competition in the face of a competitive fringe constituted by non-OPEC producers.
Introduction
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was formed at the Baghdad Conference on September 10-14, 1960 with the aim of coordinating and unifying petroleum policies among the member countries 1 "in order to [among other purposes] secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers". 2 In spite of this goal, the history of crude oil prices since the formation of OPEC suggest to some that prices are instead determined in a competitive market, perhaps interspersed by occasional attempts to restrict output that invariably unravel. That is to say that, as a cartel, OPEC has not been successful in controlling oil prices. Indeed, there appears to be no clear consensus in the empirical literature regarding OPEC's stability as a cartel or its ability to in ‡uence prices.
However, it is well-known that in an environment with signi…cant demand shocks, the optimal strategy for a cartel could result in periods of price wars that help enforce collusion in the long run (Green and Porter, 1984; Porter, 1983a) . That is, periods of price wars may represent the equilibrium outcome of a dynamic noncooperative game as shown in Green and Porter (1984) .
Thus, whether ‡uctuations in the crude oil price re ‡ect switches from collusive to non-cooperative behavior or whether they re ‡ect the normal behavior of a competitive market is ultimately an empirical question. The objective of this paper is to address this issue using a modi…ed version of Porter's (1983a) By following Porter's (1983a) approach, the analysis in this paper departs from the previous literature on OPEC behavior in several aspects. First, we estimate a structural model instead 1 The …ve founding members are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Venezuela. The current members also include Algeria, Indonesia, Nigeria, Libya, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. Angola joined the organization in 2007 and Ecuador returned to the orginaization in 2007 after suspending its membership in 1992. Indonesia suspended its membership in OPEC e¤ective January, 2009. 2 See http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/about_us/23.htm of relying on a reduced form estimation approach. Whereas a fair number of theoretical models for OPEC behavior were put forward in the last 25 years, of the few that have been empirically tested, the vast majority follows Gri¢ n's (1985) seminal work in its single-equation approach. In contrast, we start from an equilibrium model of dynamic oligopoly, which in conjunction with speci…c functional forms for the demand and cost functions determines a simultaneous switching equations model to be estimated.
Second, we study the organization as a whole, instead of considering the individual supply functions for each member country separately as in Gri¢ n (1985) . As a result, we are able to estimate a collusive indicator for OPEC. That is, Porter's (1983a) framework enables us to test for switches between collusive and non-cooperative behavior, to identify the periods in which these switches occurred, and to estimate the probability of being in a collusive period. 3 Beyond these econometric advantages, there are good theoretical and institutional reasons for treating OPEC as a whole. First, in Green and Porter's (1984) model the organization is considered as a whole, e.g. punishment phases should begin jointly. Second, to the extent that oil prices are calculated as the average of the members'crude oil streams, 4 it appears to be reasonable to assume that …rms use this market price to monitor collusion, which imperfectly re ‡ects output levels of other countries (Green and Porter, 1984) . Third, from the institutional perspective, there is ample evidence that individual members frequently respond directly to other members' outputs in such a way that overall OPEC behavior vis-à-vis the world market remains roughly unchanged (see for instance Gately, 1989 ).
In addition to taking a di¤erent approach to testing OPEC's behavior we also extend Porter's (1983a) setup to re ‡ect how OPEC di¤ers for the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel examined by him. Speci…cally, we allow for non-OPEC producers to be treated as a competitive fringe.
Because OPEC's production accounts for only 40% of the world's supply of crude, in considering whether to deviate from the collusive outcome, an OPEC member must take into account how the fringe will respond to the resulting price decrease. This modi…cation is key in testing for switches in cartel behavior and in exploring which market structure better …ts the world oil market during the period under analysis. That is, our speci…cation permits us to test across many potential market structures including perfect competition and alternative speci…cations of imperfectly competitive market structures with and without a competitive fringe.
A novel result of this paper is our …nding of signi…cant switches between collusive and noncooperative behavior during the 1974-2004 period. That is, we …nd evidence of collusion, especially during the early 1980s. We estimate the probability of being in a cooperative period to be 34%, with periods of collusion resulting in 69% higher oil prices relative to periods of quantity competition and a 11% decline in OPEC production. Interestingly, the magnitude of the increase in prices and the decline in OPEC's production is more than that estimated to result from military confrontations involving any OPEC member country. As a result, whereas periods of collusion result in a 49% rise in OPEC revenues, the increase resulting from the negative supply shock that represents a military con ‡ict represents a 32% increase in OPEC total revenues.
Regarding the market structure that best …ts the world oil market during the 1974-2000 period, we …nd statistical evidence that, on average, OPEC did not behave as an e¤ective cartel but as a non-cooperative oligopoly. Overall, our estimates are consistent with OPEC behaving as in Cournot competition in the presence of a competitive fringe.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie ‡y reviews the literature on the behavior of OPEC. Section 3 presents the model and the hypotheses that are tested. In Section 4 the data used is described. In Section 5, the results and interpretations obtained are discussed and Section 6 concludes.
OPEC Cartel Behavior: A Brief Literature Review
Not surprisingly, the rising preeminence of OPEC in the late 1970s and the increased perception that the organization could in ‡uence world oil prices, spurred empirical investigations into OPEC's behavior as a cartel. 5 Yet, there appears to be no clear consensus in the literature regarding OPEC's ability to in ‡uence prices. On one hand, a number of studies in the 1980s and early 1990s
contend that OPEC behaved as a collusive cartel during some or all of the 1970s and early 1980s. 
The Econometric Model
In this section we describe the model employed by Porter (1983a) to test the cooperative behavior hypothesis for the Joint Executive Committee of railroads (hereafter JEC), modi…ed to re ‡ect the structure of the world oil market. The econometric model proposed by Porter is aimed at estimating the Nash equilibrium model developed in Green and Porter (1984) using 1880-1886 data for the JEC. Hence, he proposes a simultaneous equation switching regression model in which the regime classi…cation is unknown and the parameters of the demand and cost functions are estimated using aggregate output and price data. Furthermore, he estimates the level of competition in a market where each of the cartel members assumes that a drop in demand could be explained either as an exogenous shock to the demand function or as a member's deviation from the collusive output, which may trigger a punishment stage. 6 Similarly, in this paper, we are interested in testing for switches in OPEC's behavior and evaluating whether the pattern of switches is consistent with the model proposed by Green and Porter (1984) . However, whereas the JEC controlled virtually all of the freight shipments during the 1880's in the U.S., the market share of OPEC is signi…cantly smaller (42% on average over the sample). Hence, to re ‡ect the structure of the oil market we modify Porter's supply function so as to enable us to treat non-OPEC members as a competitive fringe. Furthermore, this modi…cation allows us to test the whether or not the fringe exerts a statistically signi…cant impact on OPEC's ability to act as a cartel.
Following Green and Porter (1984) , we assume the demand for OPEC oil is given by a loglinear function of price and a set of demand shifters:
where ln opec t is the logarithm of OPEC's oil production, ln p t is the logarithm of world oil prices, OECD t is the log growth of GDP for OECD countries, ln nopec t is the logarithm of oil production by non-OPEC countries, and dummies t is a vector of seasonal dummies. U 1t is an error term assumed to be i.i.d. normal with mean zero and variance 2 1 .
The coe¢ cient 1 is the price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil, which is expected to be negative and greater than 1 in absolute value if OPEC indeed maximizes pro…ts as a dominant producer operating in the elastic segment of the demand curve. 7 To proxy for the e¤ect of changes 6 See Tirole (1988) p. 262 for a concise summary of the model. 7 See Alhajji and Huettner (2000) .
in the world's income on the demand for oil we use the log change in OECD t production. Although we are aware that a measure of global GDP would be a better proxy, data for the world's GDP is not available at a quarterly frequency. In addition, we use the log growth and not the log of output to ensure that all variables in the demand function are stationary. Thus, it is important to note here that 2 cannot be interpreted as the elasticity of demand with respect to income. That is, a negative sign on this coe¢ cient does not imply that oil is an inferior good; a negative sign would merely represent the (positive) rate at which demand for OPEC oil decreases when the income for OECD countries increases. Finally, the coe¢ cient on ln nopec t ; 3 ; is expected to be negative, since it is the substitute good for OPEC oil.
For the supply equation, it is assumed that OPEC chooses the quantity to be produced (which is consistent with the stated policy at a majority of their meetings). Then the world price is set and the competitive fringe produces where the world price equals their marginal cost. World demand, Q w , is given as the sum of non-OPEC output, Q no , and OPEC output, Q o , where OPEC output is the sum of each OPEC country's production:
Each OPEC member country, indexed by i, maximizes the usual pro…t function,
Here C i (q it ) is the cost of production for country i. The …rst order condition for country i is obtained by di¤erentiating (3) with respect to quantity supplied, so that:
Where the …nal equivalency follows from
The …rst order condition (4) can be rewritten as
Furthermore, de…ning the market share for OPEC as s o = Q o =Q w and the market share of country i within the organization as s i = q i =Q o , then the share of country i's production in world output is given by q i =Q w = s i s o . As in Porter (1983a), we assume that the oil produced by each country is of similar (i.e., equivalent) quality. Therefore, in equilibrium, each OPEC country obtains the same price. Thus, rearranging the …rst order condition (5) it follows that
where w = @Q w @p p Q w is the price elasticity of world oil demand.
Notice that in line with Porter's derivation, the parameter it is included in Equation (6) and de…nes …ve market structures as follows: 8 1. If OPEC members exhibit noncooperative behavior and they price at marginal cost then we have evidence of Bertrand competition. In this case, it = 0; 8i; t, which implies that OPEC has no power to set oil prices.
2. For Cournot competition with a competitive fringe, it = s i . In this case OPEC members …rst choose output levels and then world prices are de…ned; yet, world prices are also conditional on production levels by non-OPEC suppliers.
3. For Cournot behavior without a fringe, it = s i =s o ; 8i; t. In this scenario OPEC members choose the production level and then world prices are set conditional only on OPEC's output.
4. If OPEC members maximize joint pro…ts or, equivalently, follow e¢ cient cartel behavior using the collusive outcome in presence of a competitive fringe, then it = 1. 9 In other words, OPEC is the only entity de…ning world oil prices.
5. For an e¢ cient cartel without a fringe, it = 1=s 0 . Although we consider this scenario for completeness, it seems highly unlikely for the oil industry.
For estimation purposes we use aggregate output and price data, thus we derive the aggregate supply relationship in the following manner. We …rst multiply Equation (6) by each country's market share and sum over all the countries to obtain:
Let C i (q it ) = a i q it + F i be the cost function for member country i, is the constant elasticity of variable costs with respect to output, a i is a country-speci…c shift parameter, and F i is the …xed cost of …rm i. Then, the marginal cost for country i can be rewritten as
Notice that the left hand side of Equation (8) equals the right hand side of Equation (7), thus,
9 See Church and Ware (1999) for a detailed model of a dominant …rm with a competitive fringe.
where D is a function of the country-speci…c shift parameter and the constant elasticity of demand.
Taking the logarithm of Equation (9), the aggregate supply relationship can thus be written as
where I t is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the industry is in a cooperative period and 0 when it is in a reversionary period. The error term U 2t is assumed to be i. are given by
Although the market structure for an individual OPEC member can be estimated from Equation (6), we opt instead to estimate and test a model of overall OPEC collusive behavior. The motivation for this choice is twofold. First, there is evidence that some countries have adjusted their quotas for a short period of time in order to compensate for a shortage of production from another member country, thus keeping the production level of the organization unchanged. This behavior would give a wrong signal of overproduction for some countries in cases where the increased production was clearly aimed at stabilizing OPEC's total output. Second, as we mentioned before, the objective of this paper is to test OPEC's collusive behavior and the market structure as a whole, focusing on possible switches between collusive and non-cooperative behavior over time.
Letting the Her…ndahl index equal H = P s 2 i 0:08 in the oil market, and assuming it is time invariant, then 3 simpli…es to ln (1 + s o = w ). Additionally, in our sample, s 0 = 0:412 as OPEC accounted for 41.2% of world oil production over the period in examination (see Table 1 ). We can thus restate the market structure hypothesis to be tested in the following terms:
Hypotesis 1 Given the model described by Equations (1) Note that in Porter (1983a) , where there is no competitive fringe, the parameter only controls for Bertrand, Cournot, or perfectly collusive …rms. In the present model the market structure parameter allows us to test not only for these three market structures, but also for the signi…cance of the competitive fringe represented by non-OPEC producers within the previous market structures. Thus, we have …ve possible cases.
In the OPEC framework, we a priori expect the competitive fringe to be signi…cant due to the size of non-OPEC production. Unless, however, the market is perfectly competitive with OPEC and non-OPEC countries behaving as in Bertrand competition. Moreover, if there is no fringe and OPEC is an e¤ective cartel, the price and quantity used by the organization are the same as those of a pro…t-maximizing monopolist.
Equilibrium implies that quantity demanded equals quantity supplied. Therefore, from Equa-tion (1), w = 1 s o , since 1 is the price elasticity of demand for OPEC oil, and
After obtaining the price elasticity of demand from (1) and the collusive behavior coe¢ cient ( 3 ) from (10), the value of can be computed from Equation (12) .
In the OPEC setting, the supply function is given by
where war t is a dummy variable that controls for military con ‡icts involving an OPEC member country; dummies t denotes a vector of seasonal dummies,and U 2t is a normally distributed error term.
This brings us to the second hypothesis to be tested, which concerns switches between collusive and noncooperative behavior:
Hypotesis 2 Given the model described by Equations (1) and (13), then 3 > 0 if switches between collusive and noncooperative behavior took place with equilibrium prices being higher during collusive periods.
Equations (1) and (13) constitute a simultaneous equation model, in which ln p t and ln opec t are the two endogenous variables. If the I t variable is the true indicator of collusion for the cartel, the system can be estimated by three stage least squares. If, instead, the indicator of collusion is assumed to be unknown but independent of time and following a Bernoulli distribution, then the estimation is done using the E-M algorithm …rst proposed by Kiefer (1980) . Speci…cally, following Porter's notation, assume that I t equals 1 with probability and 0 with probability 1
. Rewriting Equations (1) and (13) in matrix form we get:
where y t = (ln opec t ; ln p t ) 0 ; X t = (1; OECD t ; ln nopec t ; war t ; break t ; dummies t ) 0 , U t = (U 1t ; U 2t ) 0
and dummies t is a 3 1 vector consisting of the seasonal dummies. The error vector U t is assumed to have a normal distribution with mean 0 and variance . 
where 4 and 5 are 1 3 vectors.
Because the variable I t is unknown, the probability density function is de…ned as:
With an initial estimate of the regime classi…cation sequence (w 0 1 ; ::; w 0 T ) where w 0 t = Pr(I t = 1), an initial estimate of is constructed as the mean of the classi…cation sequence. 10 Hence, maximizing the product of the density functions, initial estimates B 0 ; 0 ; 0 ; 0 are obtained. Using Bayes' formula, the new classi…cation series is updated. Thus,
where h(y t jI t ) is the probability density function of y t given I t .
Then the switching probability is updated:
This procedure is repeated until the correlation between two consecutive estimates of w t exceeds .999. As Hamilton (1994) notes, this procedure yields consistent and asymptotically Gaussian estimates of B; ; ; and . Furthermore, robust standard errors can be constructed using the usual formulas in Hamilton (1994).
The Data
The data used in this The set of demand shifters comprises the log growth of GDP for the OECD, OECD t ; the logarithm of the quantity of oil sold by non-OPEC producers, ln nopec t ; a dummy that controls 1 1 Depending on the lag length, the null of a unit root in real ln opect; lnnopect, and ln pt can be rejected using either the Augmented Dickey Fuller, Dickey Fuller-GLS (Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock, 1996) or Elliott and Jansson (2003) unit root tests. Yet, because the null of a unit root cannot be rejected in a number of cases, we tested for cointegration between these variables using Johansen trace test. This cointegration test suggests one cointegration relation.among the three variables. Consequently, in the following section we proceed to estimate the system given by (14) using the variables in levels.
for the U.S. price decontrols since the beginning of 1981, break t ; and a vector of seasonal dummy variables, dummies t = (quarter1; quarter2; quarter3) 0 .
As mentioned in the previous section, OECD t is intended as a proxy for world income. On average over the sample period, real GDP of the OECD amounts roughly to 3/4 of the world's GDP and its oil demand accounts for roughly 2/3 of the world's oil demand. This variable is computed as the …rst di¤erence of the logarithm of GDP for OECD countries, measured in millions of U.S.
dollars. The data source for OECD t is the OECD Economic Outlook.
The collusive behavior variable, P O t , is computed using the Oil Price Chronology of the U.S.
Department of Energy (Energy Information Agency, 2007). P O t takes on the value of one when
there is evidence that OPEC was in a cooperative period, and zero otherwise. Speci…cally, to compute P O t the production quotas assigned by OPEC are compared to the actual production levels: If actual production in period t is at least 5% over the quota established for that period, and there is no evidence that overproduction was a consequence of an increase in world demand, P O t is set to zero. P O t is used as the sequence of regimes I t in the 3SLS estimation and as the initial sequence I t in the maximum likelihood estimation, whereas the variable P N t corresponds to the b I t sequence that results from the maximum likelihood estimation.
Finally, to control for shifts in OPEC production due to military confrontations, the dummy variable war t is included in the supply equation. W ar t equals one when there is a military con ‡ict involving an OPEC country at time t, and zero otherwise. This variable includes the Iran-Iraq war, and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Before proceeding to the econometric analysis, consider the historical evolution and time series
properties of the variables of interest. Figure 1 plots world, OPEC, and non-OPEC oil production.
The world production has been roughly constant between 50 and 70 millions barrels per day with a slightly increasing trend. OPEC decreased its production from 1980 to 1983, but has been increasing it ever since. Supply by non-OPEC members has been more stable over time, yet it also exhibits a slight increasing trend. Indeed, oil production by non-OPEC countries surpassed OPEC's production in 1979.
In Figure 2 , we plot real world prices and the collusive behavior indicator P O t . The …gure also reports major historical events that were related to large ‡uctuations in world oil prices.
For instance, the Iranian revolution resulted in a drop of 3.9 million barrels per day of crude oil production between 1978 and 1981. Even though other OPEC members raised their production seeking to maintain the same total output, the revolution appears to have lead to higher oil prices.
This trend was reversed after the U.S. removed the price and allocation controls on the oil industry Table 1 ). This initial estimate thus suggests that OPEC acted in a collusive manner on approximately 34% of the quarters in the sample.
To get a better grasp of the production share of each OPEC member, Table 2 reports statistics about oil production by each of the member countries. 12 Notice that the OPEC "core," which is formed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (U.A.E.), Kuwait, Qatar, and Libya, accounts for over 50% of total OPEC production, with about 30% of OPEC's oil being produced by Saudi Arabia alone. Of interest is also the e¤ect of the Persian Gulf war on the supply of oil. Note that zero values are reported for periods of no production for Iraq (February and March of 1991) and Kuwait (February to May of 1991 for Kuwait). As for the OPEC's share in the world market, the organization's supply accounted for an average 41.2% of the world oil production over the period (see Table 1 ). This corresponds to about 59 millions of barrels of crude oil per day.
As a measure of industry concentration, consider the evolution of the Her…ndahl index for the world oil market, which is plotted in Figure 3 . This index is a more accurate measure of concentration than the concentration-ratio since it gives more weight to large …rms (or countries).
Using the U. Arabia is taken as a whole, the market share remains roughly constant over time (see Figure A2 ).
In the 1990s the index declines to a level lower than that observed during the 1970's; this decline is largely due to the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. in 1991 and the resulting increase in the number total OPEC oil production.
of oil producing countries. 1983 when OPEC starts using quotas instead of royalty rates; (iii) 1990, before the Gulf War and (iv) November 1997, which constitutes the last year of Iraq's participation in OPEC's agreements regarding production quotas and before its participation in the oil-for-food program. 13 As shown in Figure 3 , the Her…ndahl index is at a high level in 1983, though somewhat lower than its peak in 1981. This is re ‡ected in Saudi Arabia's share of over 40% of total OPEC production and about 10%
of the world's crude production. After 1984, Saudi Arabia's share in OPEC production declined to a level between 25% and 30%, even though its production level had been constantly increasing.
At the same time, the share of some of the smaller producers, that were already producing close to their maximum capacity, decreased. Over time, other countries like Venezuela, Nigeria and the U.A.E. slightly increased their production level; yet, their share in OPEC's output remained roughly constant.
Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 4 . The …rst column in panel (1) reports the parameter estimates for Equations (1) and (13) Focusing …rst on the 3SLS estimates, note that the parameter estimates have the anticipated sign. In the demand equation we obtain a negative price elasticity that is signi…cantly less than one in absolute value, thus suggesting an inelastic demand for OPEC's oil. According to these estimates, OPEC does not maximize pro…ts as a dominant …rm given that it does not produce on the elastic part of its demand curve. When non-OPEC production increases by 1%, demand for OPEC oil is estimated to decrease roughly by the same percentage ( 2 = 0:76%). The coe¢ cient on the OECD's GDP growth is not statistically di¤erent from zero.
The estimates of the supply equation predict suppliers'prices to be 19% higher during cooperative periods, 61% higher when an OPEC country is involved in a war, and 57% lower after the price decontrols in 1981. All three variables are signi…cant at the 5% level or lower. The production level is estimated to have no signi…cant e¤ect on the price of oil suppliers. As for the seasonal dummies, they appear to have no signi…cant e¤ect in either the demand or the supply equation.
Regarding OPEC's behavior, using Equation (11) we obtain an estimate of = 0:0327. We can reject the hypothesis that = 0 at a 5% level of signi…cance and we can reject the hypothesis of = 0:08 at the 1% level of signi…cance. Thus, the 3SLS results suggest OPEC's behavior is between Bertrand competition and Cournot competition with a fringe (see Hypothesis 1.1).
Consider now the case when the regime classi…cation is unknown and the parameter estimates are obtained by numerically maximizing the likelihood function (16) using Kiefer's E-M algorithm (panel (2) in Table 4 ). Notice that the goodness-of-…t for the demand and supply equations is better when we estimate the system of equations using the E-M algorithm than when we use 3SLS, as the R 2 for both the demand and supply equations increases in the M LE versus the 3SLS estimation.
The demand equation presents an intercept for the pre-1981 period similar in magnitude to the 3SLS estimate. Likewise, the price elasticity of demand is roughly the same magnitude across the two estimations; 0.23 for M LE versus 0.19 for 3SLS. As before, a 1% increase in non-OPEC production decreases OPEC production by almost 1% which is expected, given that OPEC and non-OPEC countries are the only two oil producers. Further, the coe¢ cient of GDP for OECD countries is still negative and statistically insigni…cant. As for the elasticity of demand, the coe¢ cient is signi…cant and less than one in absolute value, thus suggesting that OPEC does not maximize pro…ts as a dominant …rm as it operates on the inelastic segment of the demand curve.
Regarding the supply equation, the estimation results predict periods of collusion to result in a 56% increase in oil suppliers' price, whereas the coe¢ cient on the war dummy suggests a 39% increase during periods of wars involving any of the OPEC countries. Furthermore, the coe¢ cient on break suggest that the average oil suppliers'price has been 69% lower since the early 1980s. 14 The value of implied by the M LE estimates of 1 and 3 is 0:0996; which is signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at a 1% level. Note that this value of is consistent with Cournot behavior with a competitive fringe, as we cannot reject the null that To evaluate the e¤ect of political disruptions and periods of collusion on the equilibrium quantity produced by OPEC and the equilibrium world crude price, we use the M LE estimates reported in panel (2) of Table 4 . Table 5 reports the reduced-form estimates for price, quantity and total revenue, when all explanatory variables but war, P N , and break are evaluated at their sample mean. Our estimates suggest that, in equilibrium, cooperative periods lead to an 11% decrease in OPEC's production, a 69% increase in prices and 49% higher revenues for OPEC. Periods of wars involving one of OPEC's members have a lower impact on OPEC's total revenues. In fact, on average, our estimates suggest periods of wars result in a 8% decrease in OPEC's production, 49%
higher prices, and a 32% increase in OPEC's total revenue.
Regarding the probability of being in a cooperative period, the estimate obtained from the maximum likelihood procedure equals 0:340. This probability is slightly higher than the initial value of = 0:339, which is equivalent to the mean of the collusive variable P O t used in the with signi…cantly lower prices and higher production during these quarters. Our estimation results
suggest that these reversions occurred in the mid-to-late 1980s, the 1990s and the early 2000s.
Conclusion
This paper extends the framework of Porter (1983a) sample ( = 0:340) suggest that econometric studies using a longer sample period, but not allowing for switches, are likely to …nd that on average OPEC did not behave as a cohesive organization. Table 3 . OPEC production quotas, shares and Her…ndahl index for four selected years Note: "Share" is the share of each OPEC member country in OPEC's production. Production is the assigned production quota, except for 1978 where it denotes actual production. ; ;
and denote signi…cance at 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. Table 5 . Price, quantity and total revenues for di¤erent periods and di¤erent values of war and I 
The inverse price elasticity of demand is 1 = @p @p , hence we obtain the speci…ed condition. From Equation (18) it implies that s i and s o equal 1, where s o represents the market share of the monopolist, that in this case equals 1 as there is no fringe. And s i is the market share of each producer, that in the case of a monopoly also equals 1 because there is only one producer.
Therefore including the parameter it in Equation (18), the …rst order condition becomes:
where it can be tested for each of the …ve market structures for each member. As the purpose of this paper is to test for an overall behavior of the organization rather than for each member country, instead of directly testing Equation (21) we …nd an aggregate relationship to test OPEC's behavior. 
